Privacy
A privacy policy is a description of what a company has decided not to do with data it already holds. This page is different, because the arrangement is different: your mail is never in anyone's custody but your provider's and your own.
One SQLite file on your machine. Messages, bodies, attachment metadata, calendar events, contacts, notes and settings are all in it. On Windows that is under your own AppData folder, and you can open it, copy it, put it on an encrypted volume, back it up with everything else, or delete it and be done.
Search runs against that file. No server round trip, no waiting on a provider's index, no difference in behaviour between being online and being on a plane. This is also why search is fast on a large mailbox: nothing is being asked over a network.
This is the complete list. If a connection is not described here, the app is not making it.
1 — Your providers
Contacted directly, from your machine, with your own credentials. Exactly the traffic any mail client has to make. Microsoft and Google are reached over OAuth, so mailSCW never sees or stores a password for them; IMAP and CalDAV servers that only speak passwords have theirs stored locally.
2 — The push relay
Microsoft and Google will only push change notifications to a public HTTPS endpoint, and a laptop behind a router is not one. So there is one small relay. It receives the notice and forwards it to your running app, which then goes and fetches the change itself, directly from the provider. No subject, no body, no attachment, no address book has ever passed through it, and none can: the payload has no room for one.
3 — Your AI provider
Nothing is sent for AI processing in the background. Press Summarize on a thread and that thread goes; press nothing and nothing goes. The key is yours, the account is yours, and the relationship is between you and that provider — mailSCW is not a party to it and does not proxy it.
4 — Two small conveniences
The app checks its own update feed for a new build, which is an ordinary HTTPS request carrying a version number. And typing a place name into the event editor queries OpenStreetMap's geocoder for suggestions — throttled to one request a second, and only while you are typing in that field. Both are disclosed here rather than filed under "necessary technical data".
5 — The license server
Activating a license sends the email you bought it with, a random identifier for this computer, and the computer's name, so the license can be checked and moved between machines. The app checks in with it about once a day. That request carries the same identifiers and nothing about your mail.
6 — Sender logos
The round picture next to a sender comes from Google's favicon service or Clearbit, which are asked for the logo of the sender's domain — example.com, never the address, never the message. It is the one place a third party learns which companies write to you, so it belongs on this list.
What is not on the list: analytics, crash telemetry containing your content, a mailbox mirror, a third-party sync service, an ad identifier, and any endpoint that would let anyone reconstruct what is in your inbox.
The detection runs when a message body is fetched and the result is stored per message, so the list itself can show you which conversations phone home. That is a different thing from blocking them quietly: you get to see which senders are measuring you, which tends to change how you feel about a few of them.
And once allowed, they are cached locally for a lifetime you control. Without that, every reopen of an old thread is a fresh confirmation to the sender that you are still reading — re-pinging on reopen is exactly what a tracking image is for.
One-click unsubscribe posts to a URL the sender chose, from inside your network, behind your VPN and firewall, carrying a token that identifies you. mailSCW walks that chain manually, capped at five hops with one overall timeout, and refuses any hop that drops to plain HTTP or resolves to a private, loopback or link-local address. Left to itself, Chromium would follow all of it without asking.
Files are written with the internet zone marker, so Office opens them in Protected View instead of trusting them for having come off your own disk. A local-first client that quietly launders a document's origin would be worse than a cloud one.
It is read and used in the main process only. The UI is told which providers have a key configured and nothing else. It is also kept out of the settings table deliberately, so it cannot end up inside an unencrypted settings snapshot.
A settings backup that includes account credentials is encrypted in full with a passphrase you choose, using scrypt and AES-GCM. A backup file with secrets in it never sits on disk in the clear.
Notes and settings move between your machines through a hidden folder in a mailbox you already own. The mailbox is the transport. That means no new account, no vendor in the path, nothing that stops working when a company is acquired — and, usefully, a sync store you can go and look at yourself with any mail client.
Settings are merged per key rather than per document, so changing a signature on one machine and a toggle on the other in the same minute keeps both. When two machines genuinely edit the same note, you are shown both versions and asked, instead of one of them being silently overwritten by whichever synced last.
mailSCW can record a meeting you are in, capturing the microphone and system audio together, and it stores the result locally with everything else. That capability is one bad design decision away from being a bugging tool, so it is fenced in:
It also knows when to stop. If the meeting app releases the microphone and the audio goes quiet, the recording gives you a countdown you can cancel and then ends — rather than running until you remember it, which is its own small privacy problem.
Worth stating plainly, because a privacy page that only lists wins is a marketing page.
When you add a Google account, mailSCW asks Google for access to your Gmail, Calendar, Contacts and Tasks, and to your name and email address. It uses that access to show, search, send, organise and delete your mail, and to show and edit your events, contacts and tasks, all from your own machine. The data it reads is stored in the database on your disk described above, and nowhere else.
In practice that means:
Everything above is about the app. This website collects one thing: the wait list form. It keeps your email address, the name if you gave one, which computer you picked, and the date. That sits in a database on WittLogic's own server — not with a mailing-list service — and it is used once, to tell you when mailSCW is open to more people. It is not shared or sold, and nothing else is sent to it.
The form does not record your IP address. Like any web server, the one serving these pages keeps an ordinary access log of requests. To come off the list, write to the address at the bottom of this page.
mailSCW is made by WittLogic. Questions about this page, or a request about your data, go to support@wittlogic.com.
Effective October 22, 2026. If what the app does changes, this page changes with it and the date above moves.
mailSCW